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CASES NOTED
The,"No Comment" Rules: A Delicate Balance of
Fundamental Rights
The Chicago Council of Lawyers, an association of local attor-
neys, and seven members of the Chicago Bar brought an action on
behalf of themselves and all lawyers who practice before the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief, alleged that the District Court's
Local Rule 1.07 and Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility' were unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad. These rules are known collectively as
the "no comment" rules, which prohibit the release of information
by counsel "if there was a reasonable likelihood that such dissemi-
nation would interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice."2 The named defendants,3 together with
the intervening defendants,4 were granted motions to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, upon examination of the "no comment" rules to determine
whether they deprive attorneys of their first amendment right of
freedom of speech,5 held, reversed and remanded: Only those com-
ments that pose a serious and imminent threat of interference with
the fair administration of justice can be constitutionally proscribed.
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
Historically, the courts have been forced to balance the guaran-
tee of a fair trial' against the rights of freedom of the press7 and
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-107. This disciplinary rule restricts
an attorney's right to make extra judicial statements about litigation in which he is actively
involved. The attorney is not precluded from commenting on basic facts surrounding the case
such as the nature of the charg,, place of arrest, or the name of the defendant. However, the
attorney is restrained from commenting on facts or evidence which will be at issue during
the trial. He is also precluded from commenting on the character or prior record of the
accused, the identity or credibility of witnesses, and the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The purpose of this rule and Local Rule 1.07, which is virtually identical, is to limit
prejudicial pretrial publicity in order to ensure a fair trial.
2. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
3. All of the named defendants, who are the United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois, the Marshall for the District Courts and the Clerk of the District Court,
were alleged to have participated in the enforcement of those rules. Id. at 247.
4. The intervening defendants were attorneys who regularly engage in criminal cases in
the Northern District of Illinois. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF A JURY
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
freedom of speech.' The right to free speech must be protected, but
like other constitutional guarantees, it is not absolute.'
Traditionally, the canons of ethics have emphasized the im-
portance of fair trials, focusing not on the rights of attorneys, but
rather upon their duties.'" Judicial treatment of the free
speech-fair trial conflict has likewise emphasized the fair trial.
"[The] courts either ignored the first amendment question, quickly
brushed it aside, or employed a double standard in denying lawyers
first amendment protections."" Not until In re Sawyer'2 did the
Supreme Court refuse to accept the traditional notion that an attor-
ney's free speech must yield to judicial regulations.
As a prelude to the discussion in Chicago Council of Lawyers,
the court sketched the importance of the attorney's right to free
speech.' 3 Recognizing that lawyers are ably suited and situated to
identify and articulate areas of public concern, the court noted that
society derives a general benefit from "lawyers involved in investi-
gations or trials [who] are often in a position to act as a check on
the government by exposing abuses or urging action." 4 Nevertheless
SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391, 394 (1968) [hereinafter referred
to as the Kaufman Committee Reporti. The problem of publicity in the administration of
criminal justice dates as far back as Aaron Burr's trial before Chief Justice Marshall in 1809.
The defense counsel urged that the jurors had been prejudiced against Colonel Burr by
inflammatory articles carried in the Alexandria Exposition. See also Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 270 n.16 (1941). The Court cited the statement of Thomas Jefferson wherein
he referred to the putrid state to which the press had declined. " 'It is however an evil for
which there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot
be limited without being lost.'"
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. The Supreme Court has developed numerous theories defining the circumstances
and manner in which first amendment freedoms may constitutionally be regulated. Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (doctrine of vagueness); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (doctrine of overbreadth); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945)
(validity of statutes limiting first amendment freedoms).
Potential liability for libel and slander also sets limits on first amendment guarantees.
10. Note, Attorney Discipline and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 922, 924
(1974).
11. Id. at 925 (footnotes omitted).
12. 360 U.S. 622 (1959). Sawyer, defense counsel in a criminal conspiracy action, made
public statements while the trial was pending, in which she criticized the court. She was
charged with and convicted of making statements that reflected adversely upon the district
judge's fairness and integrity. The Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit's affirmation
and reversed the decision stating that "a lawyer may criticize the law-enforcement agencies
of the Government, and the prosecution, even to the extent of suggesting wrongdoing on their
part .. " Id. at 632.
1.3. 522 F.2d at 250; see 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 595, 598-99 (1971).
14. 522 F.2d at 250.
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the court recognized that certain proscriptions on speech can and
must be constitutionally invoked."
Where pretrial publicity creates a conflict between the rights to
a fair trial and freedom of speech, the court has a duty to ensure
fair trials-"the most fundamental of all freedoms."' " The very word
"trial" connotes decisions on the evidence properly advanced in
open court. It is the undistilled evidence which reaches the trier of
fact that must be limited, and this, by necessity, has prompted
various solutions.
7
The courts, in attempting to prevent prejudicial- comments
from reaching the jurors, have employed extensive voir dire, change
of venue, cautioning the jury, sequestration, continuances and ap-
peals." The modern trend is to reverse convictions where pretrial
publicity has interfered with a fair trial. 9
This trend is exemplified by Sheppard v. Maxwell,2" where
pretrial publicity deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The Su-
preme Court directed the judiciary to "take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interferences."'" To implement this mandate, the Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System, Judicial Conference of the United
States (The Kaufman Committee), drew up guidelines to imple-
ment the Court's directions in Sheppard. The results were designed
to redefine the attorney's right to comment publicly on pending
litigation. The guidelines were adopted by the American Bar Asso-
ciation22 and the District Court of Illinois. 3 It is these standards
which proscribe attorney comment which is "reasonably likely to
threaten the fair administration of justice" that the plaintiffs in
15. Id. at 251; see Fong, Fair Trial - Free Press, 61 WOMEN LAWYERS J. 13 (1975). A
person's freedom and life weight more heavily than the right of the public to be informed.
16. 522 F.2d at 248, citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
17. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
18. See Fong, supra note 15; Gelb, Fair Trials and Free Speech, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
608, 611 (1962-63); Kaufman Committee Report, supra note 7; Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial,
12 DEPAuL L. REV. 197, 209 n.39 (1962-64).
19. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
20. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
21. Id. at 363. The Court reversed and remanded a murder conviction after a finding that
massive publicity about the trial was so pervasive as to deny petitioner a fair trial.
22. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-107, cited at 522 F.2d at 263-64
(Appendix B); see notes 1, 7 supra.
23. U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. ILL. CRIM. R. 1.07, cited at 522 F.2d at 261-63 (Appendix A);
see note 7 supra.
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Chicago Council of Lawyers challenged.
In rejecting the "reasonable likelihood standard" of the Kauf-
man Committee Report, the Chicago Council of Lawyers court held
Local Rule 1.07 and Disciplinary Rule 7-107 to be constitutionally
infirm." Guided by the spirit of Grayned v. City of Rockford,"5 the
court held that the stricter standard of a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice, which was adopted in Chase
v. Robson,"6 and reaffirmed in In re Oliver,7 must be the standard
for any prohibition of free speech. "
Having adopted the "serious and imminent threat" test, the
court scrutinized the disciplinary rules as they related to criminal
proceedings. The rules generally established a presumption against
comment only so long as the "serious and imminent" standard was
applied. The court realized that this presumption was, in itself, a
serious limitation of free speech and examined each rule individu-
ally."2
The prohibition on extrajudicial comments by "a lawyer in or
associated with the investigation" was to apply only to prosecutors
rather than to all attorneys. "
24. 522 F.2d at 251. Prior to scrutiny of these rules, the court determined that the rules
were not prior restraints of speech and therefore would not be reviewed with a heavy presump-
tion against their validity. Id. at 248-49.
25. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The Court in Grayned warned that, "[wihere a vague statute
'abutlsl upon sensitive areas of First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the
exercise of Ithosel freedoms.' " Id. at 109.
26. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). The court in Chase ordered a blanket prohibition on
all extrajudicial comments on the case. It was held
that before a trial court can limit defendants' and their attorneys' exercise of first
amendment rights of freedom of speech, the record must contain sufficient spe-
cific findings by the trial court establishing that defendants' and their attorneys'
conduct is "a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice."
Id. at 106 citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947).
27. 452 F.2d ill, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1971). This was an appeal on a final judgment in a
disciplinary proceeding in which the attorney, Oliver, was found to have violated a district
court policy statement prohibiting extrajudicial comment by an attorney in the course of
litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that there was
no basis in the record upon which it could be determined "that Oliver's conduct was a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice as required by Chase." Id. at 115.
28. 522 F.2d 242.
29. Id. at 252-57. The rules pertaining to criminal trials were examined at four stages:
1) comments made during the investigation; 2) from the time of arrest or filing of charges to
the commencement of the trial; 3) during the selection of the jury or during trial; and 4)
during the period immediately after trial and before sentencing.
30. 522 F.2d at 253. For a discussion of the need for the prosecution to speak publicly




The possibility of prejudice to the Government's case which has
not even been presented by indictment or information is too re-
mote in view of the countervailing interests to justify those re-
strictions on nonprosecution attorneys.31
In addition the plaintiffs contended that the limitation on com-
ments should be lifted when the jury is sequestered, or when the
trier of fact is the bench.32 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment, reasoning that an unedited newspaper might reach the jury-
room, or perhaps the judge might decide to release the jury.:3 The
court also recognized that judges are human and. may also be af-
fected by outside information.34 The petitioners then proffered the
argument that restrictions on speech after the trial and before sen-
tencing were unconstitutional. The court agreed, stating that the
judge has broad discretion and may look to almost any factor in
determining an equitable sentence. 5
The court also severely limited the prohibition on extrajudicial
comment during civil trials. It reemphasized the need for lawyers
to articulate the social issues that arise in these trials." The rules,
as written, would not even allow a litigating attorney to write a law
review article concerning any aspect of the case. "An informed view-
point would be removed from the public forum without justifica-
tion."37 The court held that the disciplinary rules relating to civil
matters, individually and collectively, were unconstitutionally over-
broad if they created a presumption against comment even after
application of the "serious and imminent danger" limitation."
31. 522 F.2d at 253.
32. !d. at 256.
33. Id.
34. Id.; accord, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965). Contra, Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 376 (1946). "Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy
climate"; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"Weak characters ought not to be judges, . . . the press for society's sake may assume that
they are not."
35. 522 F.2d at 257.
36. Id. at 257-59.
37. Id. at 259.
38. Id. at 258. The court, when it rejected the application of the guidelines to civil trials,
stressed the difference between civil and criminal trials. A major concern of a criminal trial
is that it be fair and speedy. The civil trial should also be fair and speedy, but it tends to
have a different function. It places greater emphasis on the social changes effected. To inhibit
an attorney's right to free speech for prolonged periods (some civil trials proceed for years)
would he a burden on counsel and a detriment to society. The court, therefore, with respect
to civil trials, chose to protect the attorney's right to free speech and closed by observing:
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A basic tenet of our legal system is that laws should be drawn
to give the people a warning as to what actions are impermissible.
The court of appeals attempted to accomplish this goal. It has rede-
fined the guidelines by which a lawyer may act and be judged. The
decision has not granted the lawyer carte blanche to recklessly criti-
cize a judicial proceeding, nor has it cast aside the right to a fair
trial as the dissent suggests. On the contrary, it is implicit in the
decision that a lawyer's comments are needed to guarantee a fair
trial. A criminal trial can evoke the emotion of the public and pro-
duce massive coverage by the press. Comment by a defendant's
attorney at the initial stage of the case may offset an inherent public
presumption of guilt that accompanies an indictment."' Instead of
having to remove himself from the case, which would deprive the
defendant of counsel, or being forced to remain silent with the fear
of disciplinary measures, the active attorney may criticize the court.
The court, in redefining the area of acceptable criticism by the
attorney, has reassured the defendant of a fair trial. The litigating
counsel, with the knowledge of his rights and duties, may now re-
turn to the role of the learned judicial critic.
JEFFREY R. COOPER
The End of Fee Schedules: The Sherman Act
Applies to Lawyers Also
Desiring to purchase a home in Fairfax County, Virginia, peti-
tioners contacted a local lawyer concerning a title examination. The
lawyer quoted them the fee suggested in the minimum fee schedule
published by the respondent Fairfax County Bar Association (the
"County Bar") and enforced by the respondent Virginia State Bar
(the "State Bar").' In an attempt to find an attorney willing to
"I We do recognize the great benefits derived from allowing uninhibited comment by know-
ledgeable attorneys involved in civil litigation." Id. at 259.
:19. 6 HARV. CIv, RI(rrs-Civ. LIAR L. REV. 595, 599 (1971).
I. The State Bar had published reports condoning fee schedules and had issued two
ethical opinions indicating that fee schedules could not be ignored. VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 1969
MINIMtUM FEE SCIEDIIIE REPORT; VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 1962 MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE REPORT;
VIRGINIA STATE BAR COMM. ON LEGAL, ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 170 (1971); VIRGINIA STATE BAR
COMM. ON LEGAIL ETIC(S. OPINIONs, No. 98 (1960). The reports "provided the impetus for the
County Bar, on two occasions, to adopt minimum fee schedules." Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2015 n.21 (1975).
[Vol. 30:464
